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ABSTRACT
Thispaper presents a survey of the small, but growing, empiricai liter-
ature by economists on the consequences of comparable worth. It discusses in
turn studies of comparable worth's effects (or potential effects) on the
male/female earnings gap, on feriale employment, on female labor supply and
occupational mobility, and on womenandtheir families as a group. The
surveyiscritical in nature and areas in which further research is needed
are indicated.
Ronald C. Ebrenberg
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Ithaca, NY 14851-0952I. Introduction
Some two andahalf decades after the passage of the Equal Pay Act of
1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is still cownon to observe
that on average females earn less than males, that females are distributed
across occupations in a manner quite different from that of males, and
that earnings in female dominated occupations tend to be lower than
earnings in male dominated occupations, even after one controls for
traditional proxies for productivity. The frustrations generated by these
outcomes have led to pressure for the adoption of the principle of
comparable worth, or pay equity, a principle that at least one participant
in the debate has called "the women's issue of the l980s."
In simplest terms, proponents of comparable worth assert that jobs
within a firm can be valued in terms of the skill, effort, and
responsibility they require as well as the working conditions they offer.
Two jobs would be said to be of comparable worth to the firm if they were
comparable in terms of these characteristics. The principle of comparable
worth asserts that within a firm jobs of comparable worth should receive
equal compensation.
While some efforts to implement comparable worth have taken place in
the private sector, the major push has occurred in the state and local
government sector; a sector of the economy in which both union membership
is growing and a large proportion of the employees are women. Starting
with a 1974 state of Washington study a large number of states have
undertaken formal job evaluation studies to see how their compensation
systemsmeshwith the principle of comparable worth and a number of state
and local governments have begun to implement comparable worth either2
throug the legislative or collective bargaining process (see Ehrenberg
and Smith (1987a), Tables 10.1 and 10.2).
Although proponents and opponents of comparable worth continue to
debate the legitimacy of the concept, to some extent events have passed
them by. Economists protestations to the contrary, the concept of
comparable worth has become widely accepted in the public sector of some
states and the real policy issue is whether the concept should be extended
to other public employees in the state and local sector and to the federal
and private sectors. While debate on this issue viii undoubtedly continue
to be both emotional and political, rational decision making must include
an evaluation of what the empirical consequences of comparable worth are
likely to be. Decision makers either in the legislativeor collective
bargaining processes need toknowthingssuch as whether implementation of
comparable worth can be expected to improve female/male earnings ratios
significantly,whether itwould lead to &declinein female employment,
whether itwouldinduce morewomento enter the labor force, whether it
would help or hinder female occupational mobility and reduce occupational
segaentation,and who would "win" and whowould"lose" from the
implementation of comparable worth.
To help focus subsequent d.bate, this paper presents a nontechnical
survey of the small, but growing, empirical literature by economists on
the consequences of comparable worth. I discuss in turn studies of the
consequences of comparable worth for male/female earnings gaps, of its
pot.ntial to affectfemaleemployment adversely, of its effects on female
laborsupply and occupational.obility, and of its •ffscts on womenanà3
theirfamilies as a group. The survey is critical in nature and I point
outareas in which research is needed.
Before embarkingonthis survey, however, I should stress that there
are a nuiber of important empirical issues relevant to future policy
debate that I do not discuss. These include the existence of sex bias in
describing or evaluatir -jobs,the difficulty (some would argue
impossibility) of devising a single evaluation scheme that can
meaningfully compare the "worth' of all employees in a single firm and
the problem of rater reliability; these are all issues that have been, and
will be, addressed by noneconomists. I also do not discuss a key
theoretical issue of concern to economists, namely whether it makes any
sense to speak of the worth of a job independent of labor market
conditions. Rather, my focus is solely with empirical studies of the
consequences of implementing comparable worth.
II. Cotoar;1,le Worth and the Male/Female Eanins Can
Estimates of whether implementing comparable worth has a significant
effect on the gap between the average earnings of females and the average
earnings of males have been both ex ante and ex post in nature- Ex ante
studies, which include Ehrenberg and Smith (198Th). Sorensen (1986)
(l987a) (1987b), Johnson and Solon (1986), Aldrich and Buchele (1986), and
Smith (1988), use cross-section data to estimate how much female wages
would increase if comparable worth were implemented in a way the authors
specify. Ex post studies, which include Kahn (1987), Killingsworth
(1987a) (198Th) and Orazem and Matilla (1987) try to infer what has
happened to male and female earnings after the Actual implementation of4
comparable worth type pay adjustments in the public sector.I discuss
each type of study in turn.
A.Ex Ante Studies
Most, but not all, states have conducted job evaluations for their
employees based upon the factor point method (Treiman (1979)). The
characteristics of jobs are described and then raters assign point scores
to each job on a number of dimensions. For example, in the widely used
May Point System developed by Hay Associates. these dimensions are "know-
how, 'problem solving", "accountability" and "working conditions' •while
in the also widely used system developed by Norman D. !Jillis and
Associates. the dimensions are "knowledge and skill", "mental demand",
"accountability" and "working conditions". The points a job receives for
each category are then summed to get a total score, or measure of worth
for the job.
Assuming that the principle of comparable worth requires that jobs of
equal worth be paid equal wages, one can compute a comparable worth wage
gap (CWtJC), or estimate of how much on average wage levels in female-
dominated jobs (typically taken to be those whose employment is at least
70 percent female) would have to be increased to equal wage levels in
equally rated mate jobs (taken to be those whose employment is at least 70
percent male) as follows; First, estimate a wage equation in which a
measure of the occupational wage (e.g., the starting wage scale, the mid-
range wage scale, or the maximum wage scale in the occupation) in male-
dominated jobs is specified to be a function only of the occupations
total factor point score. Next, compute, in percentage tens, how much
the actual wage in each female-dominated job lie below this estimated male5
wageequation; this is an estimate of the magnitude of the comparable
worthwage adjustment required in each occupation. Finally, weight each
of these individual occupational wage adjustments by the share of
employees in each occupation and thenaggregate across the female
dominatedoccupations o come up with the CWWC.
This was the approach followed by Ehrenberg and Smith (1987a) and
Sorensen (l987a) who together studied pay systems for state government
employees in five states and local government employees in one
municipality prior to any implementation of comparable worth in the
jurisdictions. Of course, in implementing the methodology described
above, the researchers had to decide which wage measures to use (Sorensen
used a single measure Ehrenberg and Smith experimented with starting,
mid-range and maximum salaries), which functional form to use to describe
male wages (Sorensen used a linear equation, Ehrenberg and Smith
experimented with linear and loglinear functional forms), and whether to
enter the four individual factor point scores rather than the total score
as predictors in the male equation (Ehrenberg and Smith experintented with
the four factor point scores because this allows the existing male-
dominated occupational structure to determine the marginal value the state
places on an additional point in each of the four categories, rather than
assuming that only total factor points should affect wages).
Their results are summarized in Table 1.CWWCinthe range of 15.4
to 33.5 percent were found for the six jurisdictions. The range of
estimates for each stats from the Ehrenberg and Smith study occurred
because of all the experimentation they did. However, in each case their
estimates were fairly robust to the methods used.6
Given these estimates, one can compute the effect of making such
comparable worth wage adjustments on the relative earnings of men and
women by computing hypothetical wages for alt female and male employees
after such adjustments (assuming these adjustments are made only in
female-dominated occupations and are given to employees of bg,ch sexes
employed in these occupations) and then contrasting the ratio of average
female to average male wages after the adjustments to the ones that
existed before. This was the procedure followed by Sorensen: the
unweighted average (across the six jurisdictions) earnings ratio she
observed before the hypothetical adjustments was 76 percent, while after
the adjustment the average earnings ratio was 87 percent. So, she
concluded chat on average, such comparable worth wage adjustmencs would
reduce the female/mate earnings gap for ovenent emolovees in these
jurisdictions by about 45 percent (11/24).
For a number of reasons, however, one must be cautious in drawing
conclusions from these numbers about the likely effects of implementing
comparable worth for state employees. First, in some of the states (e.g.
Washington).the jobevaluations covered only a sample of state employee
occupations; the results may not generalize to other state employee
groups. Second, such wage adjustments raise total, labor costs (on average
Sorensen computes this increase to be 8 percent of payroll) and this
increase in labor costs along with the changing relative costs across
occupations may cause the level and composition of employment across
occupations of males andfemalestochange. Sorensen implicitly assumes
noemploym.nt changes in these calculations. Finally, given the political
nature of both the collective bargaining and legislative processes and the7
constant pressure by groups to improve their job evaluation scores (see
Ehrenberg and Smith (1987a), footnote 17). there is reason to believe that
actual comparable worth wage adjustments that are implemented would not
approach the magnitudes described above. Indeed, as we shall see below.
several studies sugges that in practice they have been much smaller in
several states.
Private sector ex ante studies, such as Johnson and Solon (1986).
Sorensen (1987b), Aldrich and Buchele (1986) and Smith (1988) have adopted
somewhat different approaches. Johnson and SolDn use a Large national
sample of both private and public sector workers taken from the May 1978
current pooulption Survey and estimate wage equations for males and
females as functions of the individuals personal characteristics (e.g.,
age) industry dummy variables, occupational characteristics variables
(developed by the National Research Council), and a variable measuring the
fraction of an occupation nationwide that is female. In such wage
equations, a larger share of female employment in an occupation is
associated with lower wages.
Johnson and Solon then interoret the concept of comparable worth to
mean that it would be illegal to have this share influence wages and
simulate how much the average female/male wage gap would be reduced if the
coefficients of the female share were set equal to zero. Depending upon
the specification they use, an overall female/male wage differential of
roughly 41. percent is estimated to decline by 3 to 8 percent when this
restriction is imposed. So comparable worth is estimated to reduce the
overall wage gap by at most one-tenth to one-fifth by them.B
A similar calculation was undertaken by Aldrich and Buchele who use a
different sample of data, the National LonEitudinal Surveys, and find that
"comparable worth would reduce the aggregate female/male wage gap by one-
fifth. So their estimate and those of Johnson and Solon are fairly
consistent.
Finally. Sorensen (l987b) extends and replicates Johnson and Solon's
analysis, using more recent data from the May and June 1983 Current
Population Surveys that permit her to include additional variables (e.g.,
firm size) in her estimated wage equations. Like them, she concludes that
a comparable worth policy would reduce the overall wage-gap by at most
one-fifth. Quite strikingly, however, the potential effect of such a
policy is seen to vary widely across sectors of the economy. While she
estimates the policy might reduce the female/male earnings gap by about
one-third in the public sector, and one-quarter in the nonmanufacturing
private sector (defined by her to include all industries except for
manufacturing and the public sector), at best it would reduce the gap in
manufacturing by only six percent.
Of course, none of these authors' concept of comparable worth really
corresponds to the definition of comparable worth that proponents expound,
namely equal wages within a firm for jobs of equal value. The authors
control for interindustry and (in Sorensen's case) firm size wage
differentials, but these are incomplete controls for fin-specific wage
differentials.Other studies also suggest that the magnitud, of the
coefficient of the female occupational employment share variabl, is
sensitive to the variables that are includedin thewag.equation, with
more controls reducing the magnitude (see for example, Filer (1987)).9
Moreover, as Johnson and Solon and Sorensen note, their estiaated
comparable worth effects would be diminished ifcoverageof comparable
worth wasincomplete. Formal job evaluations tend to be conducted only by
large firms and Johnson and Solon conjecture that only 40 percent of
workers, namely those mp1oyed by the government sector and large private
firms, would be affectedAssuming that the magnitudeof the female/male
wagegapdoes not depend upou wtaether an individual employer would be
covered by comparable worth, they further estimatethat the overall effect
ofcomparable worth would be to reduce the wage gap by only 1.4 to 3.2
percent, far less than one-tenth of the overallgap.
Sorensen's(1987b) resultsare relevant to this point. While
coverageof workers under comparable worth might be large in manufacturing
where many employees are employed in large establishments (U.S. &areau of
the Census, l985a) her evidence (cited above) suggests that comparable
worth's likely effects would be small in this sector. In contrast, in the
nonmanufacturing private sector, where she estimated comparable worth to
have the potential to reduce the wage gap by a quarter, only a small
fraction of employees would likely be covered. For example, if coverage
wasrestricted to employees employed in firms with at least 100 employees,.
only about 49percent ofthe employees inthe service industry and 48
percent in retail trade would be covered (U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1985b) Table 5 and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985c) Table 5). If
instead the minimum finn size for coverage was set at 500,thesenumbers
wouldfall to about 29 percent and 38 percent respectively.
Of course, these crude calculations assume that females and wales are
distributed across different sizes of firmsinthe same manner and that10
all employees, not justthosein occupations that are predominantly
female, would beeligible forcomparable worth wageadjustments.More
refined calculations are made by Smith (1988) who uses the May1979
Current PonulationSurvey data,whichhave information on individuals'
industryoccupation, and size of employer to estimate themaximum
fractionof woioen who might have their wages adjusted by a comparable
worth policy. He assumes that only femalesemployed in jobsthat are(a)
atleast 60 percent female and (b) are either nonteaching jabs in the
public sector (since it is hard to envision other jobs "comparable" to
teachers in education) or private sector jobs in firms whose employment
wasat least 500. would be eligible for such wage adjustments. Using
these criteria he concludes that only 23 percent of females would likely
be covered by comparable worth and that these would tend to be higher paid
women. So overall, comparable worth effects on women's wages might be
even less than Johnson and Solon estimate.
3. Ex Post Studies
After a well-publicized strike over the issue, the city of San Jose,
California was the first city in the United States to implement comparable
worth for its employees via the collective bargaining process. Five wage
adjustments to achieve comparable worth took place in San Jose during the
July 1981-July 1984 period. Two studies, Kahn (1987) and Killingsworth
(1987a), provide estimates of what the effects of these adjustments were.
Boththesestudies try to make inferences based upon before-after
comparisons, which require them to infer what would have happened in San
Jose in the post 1981 period in the absence of the adjustments. As the
discussion will indicate, this is not asimpletask.11
Kahn focuses on the wage increases for San Jose city jobs that were
targeted to receive comparable worth increases and contrasts them to the
wage increases in nontargeted city jobs. She finds that during the July
1980-July 1986 period the increases in targeted job wages averaged 74
percent. In contrast, wage increases for other jobs in the city (just
those that had been part of an original pay equity survey) averaged
roughly 50 percent during the period. Since a similar pattern of relative
wage changes was not observed for the jobs in other nearby local
governments, she concludes that the observed difference in San Jose may
have been due to the comparable worth efforts. I say 'may here because,
while the other job wage scales in San Jose were roughly equal to those in
the surrounding areas in 1980, the wage scales in the jobs targeted to
receive comparable worth increases were somewhat lower in San Jose.
Hence, some of the observed difference in wage increases for the two sets
of jobs in San Jose may simply have been responses to market forces,
although Kahn does note that public sector wages in San Jose in the
targeted (clerical) occupations were higher than private sector wages in
these occupations in San Jose in 1980.
Killingsworth (l9Sla) focuses his analysis on the 170 full-time job
classifications that were part of the original pay-equity survey. He
finds that between October of 1981 (after the implementation of the first
comparable worth wage adjustment) and July of 1986. mean pay grew by 30.5
percent and 38.1 percent in the male-dominated and female-dominated jobs
respectively, which like Kahns analysis suggests comparable worth may
have had an effect (smaller in his case) on wages in female occupations.12
To model more formally whether comparable worth adjustments affected
wages in both the female and male occupations in the city, Killingsvorth
conducts both cross-section and longitudinal econometric analyses. As he
notes, the longitudinal analyses, in particular his fixed and random
effects models, are preferable and I discuss them here.
In both cases. Killingsworth uses salary data by occupation for
points in time (July 1980. October 1980, October 1981, January 1983.
August 1983, March 1984. April 1985. and July 1986); the first two dates
preceded the implementation of comparable worth, while the latter six
occur during and after the implementation. The logarithm of the salary in
occ_ation i at time Cisspecified to be a linear function of a time
trend term (the number of days between July 1980 and the date), a dummy
variable that takes on the value of one once comparable worth had begun to
be implemented (the last six dates) and zero otherwise, and an occupation
specific effect that is assumed to be either fixed or random. The models
are estimated separately for the male and female occupations and in each
case he interprets the coefficient of comparable worth as indicating by
how much, on average, comparable worth increased wages in these
occupations.
ltillingsworth finds that on average comparable worth caused male
wages to increase by about 9 percent more than otherwise would have been
the case and female wages to rise by about 12 percent more. As such, he
concludes that comparable worth in San Jose increased female wages by
about3percent relative to male wages during the period; this difference
was statistically significant from zero in the fixed effects model but not13
in the randomeffectsmodel. He thusfinds much smallereffects for
comparable worth than Kahndid.
Killingsworth's findings, however, raise twoquestions.First, why
shouldcomparableworth wage adjustments in female jobs cause wages to
rise faster than would otherwise be the case in gjjobs?Indeed, one
fear of critics of comparable worth is that comparable worth wage
increases would be financed by restricting wage increases in other public
sector jobs; one might thus expect comparable worth adjustments to reduce
wage increases in male jobs.
Thisleads to the second question, whyshould one assume (as his
modelimplicitly does) that in the absence of comparable worth
adjustments, wage increases would have increased at a constant rate in San
Jose during the July 1980-July 1986 period. In fact, for the economy as a
whole, average hourly earnings growth varied considerably during the
period,falling fromover 9 percent in 1980 and 1981 to under 4 percent in
1984,1985and 1986. Theeffects he attributes to comparable worth may
reflect only nonlinear underlyingtrend rates of growth of earnings in San
Jose.
Killingsworth (1987b) uses essentially the samemethodological
approachto estimate the effects of threesets of comparable worth wage
adjustments that werelegislativelyenactedfor Minnesota state employees
between1983 and 1986 (these became effective in July 1983, July 1984, and
July 1985). He analyzes data for a random sample of 1,000 white male and
1,000 white female employees who were present and active in state
employment during the entire October 1981-April 1986 period and asks
whether, after holding constant changes in personal characteristics and16
and Smith (1987a; 1987W and Ehrenberg,Smith and Stratka (1986), who
simulate the effect on female employment in the state and local sector of
imposing comparable worth in the sector andAldrichand Buchele (1986),
whoperformsimilar simulations using economy wide private Sector data.
Included in the latter category are Gregory and Duncan's (1981) analyses
of how comparable worth type wage adjustments influenced female employment
in Australia. and Kahn (1987) and Killingsworth (1987a) (1987b) analyses
of how comparable worth wage adjustments in San Jose and Minnesota,
respectively, affected municipal employment and state employment levels in
these jurisdictions.
Comparable worth wage increases would tend to increase the wages of
female employees relative to male employees within any major occupational
group (e.g., clerical) as females are more likely to be employed in
female-dominated decailed occupationalgroups (e.g., secretaries) chat
would receive CWWA increases. Similarly, CWA increases would tend to
increase the average wage costs in those major occupational groups that
contain many female-dominated occupations (ag., clerical) relative to
chose major occupational groups (e.g., blue-collar workers) that contain
fewer female-dominated occupations. As such, one might expect to observe
decreases in female employment, both because of within major occupational
group male/female employment substitution away from female-dominated
detailed occupational groups and because of substitution away from female-
dominated major occupational groups. To the extent that CWVA increases
forfemale-dominatedgroups are not paid for by smaller wage increases
formale-dominated groups, average wageswould rise,which should further
depress both female and male employment.14
allowing for long-ten pay trends, salary changes werelargerfor women
than for men after the comparable worth wage adjustments. He concludes
that women's wages grew cumulatively by about 7 percent mnandmen's
wages by about1.4 percentunthanthey would have grown during the
period, in the absence of comparable worth. However, again, one must
question his assumptions of constant trend growth rates of earnings for
men and women in the absence of the comparable worth adjustments.
Orazem and Matilla (1987) use a different approach to estimate the
impact that a comparable worth policy had on the wage gap for Iowa state
employees. Based on a job-evaluation study conducted by Arthur Young and
Associates, a pay equity program was proposed in 1984 for Iowa employees.
However, the proposal, which called for wage decreases for about 40
percent of the covered employees, was subject to considerable political
debate and eventually a "compromise" program was adopted in 1985 that
moderated the wage increases "winners" received and eliminated at]. the
proposed reductions.
Orazem and Katilla use data on a random sample of state employees and
estimate wage equations for them using individual characteristics, job
evaluation point scores, andseveralother variables, including whether
the employs. was a woman, as explanatory variables. Three different Wage
outcomes are analyzed; the employees actual wage scale as of December
1983 (prior to the comparable worth plan), the employee's wage scale as
proposed undertheArthur Young plan, andtheemployee's wage scale after
the implementation of the politicalcompromise. Focusing on how the
co.ffici.nt of the "female"variabi.changes with the wage outcome used
allow, the authors to escirsate what the effects oftheoriginal comparable15
worthproposal and the compromise that was adopted were on the male/female
wage differential.
Thepreciseestimates the author, obtain aresomewhatsensitive to
theexplanatoryvariable, they include in their estimating equations.
Someoftheirspecificationsinclude privatesectormarket wage rates for
occupationsas measured by an annualwagesurvey conducted by the state - -
presuaablyproponents of comparable worthwould preferto see this
variable excluded. Some specifications include the job evaluation point
scores, while others do not. Nonetheless, all tend to suggest that the
pay-equity policy that was actually implemented reduced the unexplained
(by the wage equations) wage gap by about a quarter, while the proposed
policy would have almost completely eliminated the gap.
In an absolute sense, their estimates suggest that the policy that
was implemented increased the average female state ewployees wage scale
in Iowa by about 1 to 4 percentage points relative to the average males
wagescale. These numbers should be contrasted to an average 8 percentage
point gain that they estimate the original Arthur Young pay equity
proposal would have produced. Comparable worth policies implemented
through the political process do not necessarily lead to 'comparable
worth". Indeed, using analyses very similar to Orazem and Mattila (1987).
Killingsworth (1987b) reaches this same conclusion.
III. Ce.tarable WorthandTaolanent Levels
Aswith studies of the effect of comparable worth on earnings.
studies of the effect of comparable worth on employment have been both ex
anteand ex post in nature, Included in the former category are Ehrenberg17
A.Ex Ante Studies
Ehrenberg and Smith (1987a; 1987b) use data from the1980Census of
Pornilatio,, grouped by state (for state employees) and SMSA (for local
government employees) to simulate what the likely effect of a 20 percent
wage increase for all female employees in the sectors would be on female
employment there. Their simulations are based on estimates of within-
occupation male/female substitution elasticities obtained from a constant
elasticity of substitution production function specification, and
estimates of across-occupation substitution elasticities obtained from a
translog cost share specification. Because the estimated elasticities
they obtain are quite small, they conclude that a 20 percent increase for
at]. femaleemployees in the sector would reduce female employment byonly
2to3 percent.
Aldrich and Buchele (1986) apply Ehrenberg andSmiths approach to
private sector data using three-digit industries, rather than geographic
areas as units of analyses. They obtain very similar employment effects.
predicting that private sector comparable worth wage increases in the
range of 10 to 15 percent would reducefemale employmentby roughly 3
percentinthat sector.
While female employmentlosses ineachof these studiesseemssmall
and should allaycritics' fears that comparable worth wage increases in
theU.S. would lead to large female employment losses, itshould be
emphasizedthat these estizates are based on cross-section demand
elasticitiesthat use broad occupational groups (4 in total) and that do
not control for area specific (in th. case of Ehrenberg/Smith) or industr
specific (in thecase of Aldrich/Buchele) factors thatmight influence18
eithermale/female employment ratios within occupations or the
occupational distribution of employment. Ehrenb.rg, Smith and Stratka
(1986) use longitudinal data on local government employment and wages from
theEqualEmployment Opportunity Coission's EEO-4 dat; to try to control
for suchomitted area specific variables and also use a larger number of
occupational ,categories (8). However, these modifications did not
fundamentally alter any of the conclusion that only small employment
effects would result.
B. Lx Post Studies
There are serious data problems (acknowledged by all the authors)
that limit the usefulness of the above studies for public policy
simulations and the simulations are often based on statistically imprecise
parameter estimates. As such, it is useful to turn to the ex post
studies. Cregory and Duncan's (1981) time series study of the Australian
employment experience after the institution of comparable worth type wage
adjustments found that relative (by sex) employment demand elasticities
with respect to relative (by sex) wages were sufficiently small, that the
substantial relative wage increases for women that occurred between 1g75
and 1978 in Australia reduced female employment growth by only
approximately1.5percentage points a year. The estimated slowdown in
employmentgrowth was smallest in the public (close to zero) and service
sectors, and largest in manufacturing. Ofcourse, whether 1.5 percentage
pointsper year is a small effect should be judged in the context of an
overall female employment growth rate of 3 percentage points per year more
than the male growth rate during the period. Viewed in the context of
this number, the Australian policy reduced the employment growth rate19
advantage of females vis-a-vis males by one-third (1.51(3.0+1.5)). As
noted above, male employment is also likely to be affected by comparable
worth policies; this was not analyzed by them.
In later work, Gregory, Anstie, Daly and Mo (1987) present analyses
of the Australian data that cover the 1966-1984 period. While no formal
econometric analyses are conducted in this paper, they note that women
increased their share of hours worked in Australia during the period and
that the growth rate of this share was dominated by a trend with no sharp
slowdown occurring after the large (in the range of 20 percent) comparabli
worth type wage adjustments occurred. From this they conclude that any
relative employment effects of the policy must have been very small,
although they note that they again did not analyze the effects of the
policy on total employment. In fact, Ehrenberg and Smith (1987a) (198Th)
found in their simulations that the potential adverse effect of a
comparable worth policy on female employment in the United States would bi
primarily through its effect on total employment.
The two studies of the San Jose experience reach conflicting
conclusions. Kahn (1987) finds that municipal employment grew more
rapidly during the 1981-86 period in the San Jose public sector than in
other neighboring cities, that employment in the municipal jobs targeted
for CWWA inSan Jose grewmore rapidly than municipal employment in
nontargeted jobs, and that the share of female employment in these
targetedjobs actually increased. From this evidence she concludes that
comparableworth had no adverse employment effects, that higherwages in
the targeted jobs induced morefemaleapplicants, and that it was20
affirmative action, or increased female labor supply in general, that led
to the increases in female employment.
It is hard to evaluate the validity of Kahn's findings because they
are all based on simple comparisons of trend increases in employment
across occupations in San Jose and/or across local governments in the San
Jose area. Put another way, implicitly she is assuming that in the
absence of comparable worth municipal employment would have grown at the
same rate for all occupations in San Jose and that this rate would have
equalled the growth rate of municipal employment in neighboring cities.
As such, she does not allow for factors other than comparable worth to
influence employment growth and labor supply across occupations and areas.
Killingsworth (1987a) estimates a fixed effects model using data for
six points in time and the 170 full-time job classifications that were
part of the original San Jose jab evaluation study. The logarithm of
employment in an occupation at each time is specified to be a function
only of the logarithm of the occupational wage at that time, a time trend
term to control for general growth in employment, and occupation specific
dummy variables. Separate equations are estimated for male and female-
dominated jobs and he concludes that negative wage elasticities of demand,
in the range of minus one, exist for both the male and female-dominated
occupations. He attributes the actual employment increases that Kahn
observes to his time trend ten. (which is roughly 9 percent per year for
both mate and female dominated jobs). Given his estimate (sea the
previous section) that the CWWA increased male wages by about 9 percent
and female wages by about 12 percent. he concludes that these wage
adjustments actually "cost" San Jose male municipal employees one year's.21
and female municipal employees more than one year's employment growth
during the period.
Killingsworth (1987b) performs similar analyses for Minnesota using
data for 876 male-dominated state jobs and 203 female-dominated state jobs
over 19 quarters during the October 1981-April 1986 period. He again
finds (when starting wage scale data are used) wage elasticities in the
range of minus one for bath wales and females. These, when coupled with
his estimated wage effects reported earlier, suggest that the comparable
worth wage adjustments in Minnesota decreased female employment by about 7
percent and increased male employment by about 1.4 percent during the
1981-1986 period. The estimated female effect is equivalent to a loss of
about one year's employment growth for women.
Of course, his results for both San Jose and Minnesota are contingent
first on his estimated CWWA effects on male and female wages in these
jurisdictions: as noted in section II, I believe there are problems with
these estimates. Second, his employment equations do not permit
interoccupational substitution (an occupation's wage influences its
employment level only), and assuwe that omitted time specific factors
influence all occupations (in a sex group) identically and at a constant
rate over time. Indeed, no thought is given to the possibility that
comparable worth per se may have influenced the trend rate of growth of
employment (one of Kahn's points) independent of its effects via wage
rate.. While my ownpreferenceis to prefer rigorous econometric
aod.].ling, such as Killingsvorth's, the juryis still out onwhat
comparable worth's effects have been on municipal employment in San Jose
and state employment in Minnesota.22
IV. General Eauiiibrim consider&tions Who Viii Win and Who Will Lose
Thestudies discussed in the previoussection ignorethepartial
coverageaspect (see section II) of any comparable worth policy that is
likely to be implemented in the United States. If comparable worth has
adverse employment effects in the covered sector, displaced workers may
seek jobs in the noncovered sector and downward pressure on wages there
would result. Even if female employment losses in the covered sector are
low relative to the wage gains induced by comparable worth there, it is
not obvious that women as a group would gain, for women in the low-paid
noncovered sector (see Smith (1987)) might find their wages lowered even
more by the crowding" of displaced workers into that sector.
Alternatively, increased wages in the covered sector might induce
some of the displaced females to remain "attached" to the covered sector
in the hope of obtaining a now higher-paying job in the future. Thus, the
policy might lead to "wait-unemployment" among females. As is well-known.
in this case the increase in female unemployment may exceed the number of
females displaced by the increase in covered sector wages caused by the
CWA policy,and the direction that the female wages in the noncovered
sectorwould move would depend upon demand elasticities in both sectors
(see Ehrenberg and Smith (1988). Chapter 12, for a more extended
discussion of wait unemployment).
Of course, in addition to influencing the allocation of female labor
between the coveredand noncovered sectors, CWWAmay also influence female
laborforce participation rates and occupational choice. Higber wages in
somefemale-dominated occupations might induce morewomen to enter the23
labor force and increase the supply of women to occupations in which the
adjustments took place (Kahn (1987)). Higber wages in these occupations
m*gbt increasetheir attractiveness to incumbents and new entrants and
thusreduce the mobility of women into traditionally male-dominated
occupations.Finally, higher wages intraditionally female-dominated
occupations might increase the supply of males to these occupations,
thereby reducing occupational segregation.
Empirical research relating to these topics has been surprisingly
slim. As noted above, Kahn (1987) foundthatCWWA were associated with
increased female representation in targeted occupations in San Jose.
Beider, Berriheim, Fuchs and Shoven (1987, henceforth BUS) simulate some
of the effects of a policy that raised female wages (like comparable
worth) in a computable general equilibrium model. While their simulations
likely overstate the effects of comparable worth, because the policies
they simulate eliminate all within major occupational group gender
differences in earnings, their results are of interest because they are
the only authors who analyze comparable worth formally in a general
equilibriumframework empirically.
BBFSfindthat comparable worth would induce more married women to
enter the labor force and that increased employmentfor these women would
beat the expense of employment for males and singlewomen.Despite the
latter's loss of employment, in a distributional sense as a group they
would gain because oftheir increased wages. In contrast, married couples
wouldlos. (increasedemploymentof married women would be offset by
decreased employment for some of their husbands) •andsingle men asa
groupwouldbe the big losers. BZFS also present estimates of efficiency24
and employment losses under a variety of assumptions about, for example,
coverage of comparable worth (partial or total) •thenature of married
couples'utilityfunctions, elasticities of supply and substitution, and
employerhiring rules (applicant fraction or historical fraction) and are
careful to stress the sensitivity of their results to changes in
assumptions. Nonetheless, to keep their model"computablethey are
forcedto limit it toonly twooccupationalgroups (skilled and
unskilled).This restriction prevents them from addressing a number of
the issues described above.
V.Cancludint Remarks
Asthis surveyhas shown,weknow very little about what thetrue
"general equilibrium"effectsof comparable worth are likely to be. The
research described above has cDncentrated heavily on estimating what the
direct effects of comparable worth might be on the female/male wage gap
and what the likely direct effects of comparable worth wage changes might
be on female employment in the covered sector. Although the authors of
the various studies might disagree my evaluation of the evidence is that
it is fairly consistent. The studies surveyed in sections II and III
suggest to me that comparable worths direct effects will be to reduce the
overall female/male wage gap modestly and that this reduction will be
achieved at the cost of only small female employment losses.
What is missing, how'ver, is much discussion of the true general
equilibrium, or second round effects, that comparable worth is likely to
induce. Will the altered wage structure affect the occupational choices
of males and females in the covered sector and/or employers' hiring25
decisions? Will the changing wage structure in one sector of the economy
lead to alterations in the wage structure in the rest of the economy?
Will higher mandated wages in female-dominated jobs lead to higher
implicit hiring standards, or employers compensating by providing less on-
the-job training? Will these higher wages reduce female occupational
mobility over the life-cycle and female earnings growth rates (see
Hashimoto (1982) for evidence that minimum wages affect earnings growth
rates)? Analyses of issues like these should be on the agenda of
comparable worth researchers.26
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Table1
Estimatesof Comparable Worth Wage Caps
(CWWG) for State Employees in Selected States
and Municipal Employees in San Joset
Estimated
Job Evaluation Percentage
Study JurisdictiDTl/Year System CWWC
Ehretherg and Minnesota/198l Hay 14.6 to 20.0
Smith (1986)
Washington/l974 Willis 21.9 to 23.9
Connecticut/1980 Willis 15.4 to 20.2
Sorensen (l987a) Towa/1983 Arthur Young 15.9
Michigan/early 1980s Arthur Young 17.5
Minnesota/1981 Hay 21.4
San Jose/1982 Hay 25.5
Washington/1983 Willis 33.5
a The larger estimate observed by Sorensen for the state of Washington
than those obtained by Ehrenberg and Smith may reflect their using data
from different years for this state (1983 versus 1974).